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Abstract
The Deutsch-Wallace-Everett programme is conceptually incoherent since its viability rests
upon a notion of decoherence that conflicts with its own fundamental precepts in two respects.
These problems are not alleviated by invoking the notion of emergent or robust structure, and
are argued to be significant enough to cast doubt upon the viability of the entire neo-Everettian
enterprise as it now stands.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, Everett-type approaches have assumed an eminent, if not quite pre-eminent, posi-
tion among the various interpretations of quantum mechanics. This rise in the perceived persua-
siveness of Everettian arguments can be related to two significant new developments. First, it was
understood that decoherence could provide a foundation for an interpretation of the wave function
in terms of a superposition of branches which, after forking off, remained effectively independent
from each other. Second, it was suggested that a satisfactory Everettian interpretation of quantum
mechanics could be based on a purely subjective1 perspective on the probabilistic role of the wave
function. According to this understanding, the connection between the wave function and proba-
bilities does not rely on any objective characteristics of the many worlds scenario (be it objective
probabilities, numbers of branches or other) but is rather a product of the rational behaviour of
agents who find themselves in one branch of the Everettian universe.
This new, subjectivist understanding of Everettian quantum mechanics was given a formal basis
through the work of Deutsch [1] and Wallace [2, 3, 4] (see also [5]); with their proofs demonstrating
that, provided Everettian quantum mechanics is true, the Born rule can be established, under
certain conditions, as being constitutive of any rational betting behaviour on future outcomes of
quantum experiments.
Various critical responses to this Deutsch-Wallace-Everett (DWE) approach to quantum theory
have been put forward. A majority of these focus upon the the structure of the decision theoretic
proof itself, and rely either on disputing the notion of rationality [6], or on challenging the derivation
1Here the use of ‘epistemic’ rather than ‘subjective’ would perhaps be more consistent with the terminology in
use within the philosophy of science. However, we will retain the original terminology to avoid confusion.
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of the Born rule as a unique/viable subjective probabilistic measure [7, 8]. Such internal criticisms
rest upon implicitly accepting the viability of the DWE framework but questioning particular
aspects of its implementation. Another important line of criticism seeks to undermine the DWE
claim of a derivation of the Born rule on the basis of a decoherence related circularity objection
[9, 10, 11, 12]. A further perceived problem relates to the role played by probabilistic empirical
phenomena within the the DWE approach. Prima facie, within the DWE framework as it stands
there seems no natural connection between the part played the Born weighting, as assigned to
branches, and empirical statistical data that can be observed within a single world situation, and
this might be seen to cast doubt upon the empirical viability of the approach.2
Thus, various authors have already found reasons to claim that the DWE approach has certain,
major conceptual flaws. In the present paper, we want to make a stronger claim. We will argue
that the DWE programme is conceptually incoherent since its viability rests upon a notion of
decoherence that conflicts with its own fundamental precepts.
This problem is argued to be a severe one and is, as we shall see in Section 4, not alleviated by
invoking the notion of emergent or robust structure. Properly considered, we believe the incoherence
issues identified are significant enough to cast doubt upon the entire neo-Everettian enterprise as
it now stands.
2 The Deutsch-Wallace-Everett approach to Quantum Mechanics
2.1 Probability and decoherence
Assume that an agent carries out a quantum mechanical experiment with a number of different
possible outcomes. Broadly speaking, Everett-type interpretations of quantum mechanics relate
each one of the possible distinct outcomes to a particular branch within a ‘many worlds’ universe.
We understand this universe as including a representation of every physically possible outcome of
this and every other experiment (where, under some understandings, ‘experiments’ are taken to
include a variety of spontaneous physical processes); and we understand these representations to
exist within an ordered branching tree structure, where a set of worlds following on from every
distinct outcome of every experiment can be identified with its own independent ‘sub-tree’. If we
assume that our experiment is the initial branching event (which is equivalent to focusing in on
one particular sub-tree), then immediately subsequently we can think of a many worlds universe as
constituted purely by an array of worlds, with one world corresponding to each possible outcome
of our experiment.
Now, since an instantiation of our agent exists in each one of these worlds, the agent’s chances
of finding themselves in one specific world after the experiment might be expected to be directly
determined by the proportion of worlds within which the relevant experimental outcome obtained.
In the tree picture, this is of course just equivalent to counting the number of branches with the
relevant outcome that fork off from the initial state of the experiment, and then dividing this by the
2See [13] for further discussion of this and related issues.
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total number of branches. Intuitively then, one may expect that within an Everettian picture the
probabilities relevant to the outcomes of quantum mechanical experiments can be obtained simply
via such a branch counting methodology. However, it transpires that if we consider an agent who
adopts a branching counting strategy, they will not, in general, reproduce the probabilities provided
by quantum mechanics (see e.g. [14]). Thus, to make sense of probability in an Everettian setting
we require both: i) a good reason to discount the viability of the (seemingly intuitive) branch
counting strategy; and ii) an alternative methodology leading to the correct Born rule measure.
According to the Deutsch-Wallace argument (on this see in particular [3, §9]) it is decoherence
effects – which, as discussed below, are in any case needed to ground the discreetness of the
branches – that provide the basis for an argument towards the impossibility of extracting probability
statements on the outcomes of quantum experiments from branch counting. Since decoherence
is fuzzy in the sense that there is no precise way of telling at what point in time it occurs, it is
impossible to specify one definitive branching structure for a quantum process. This in turn implies
that no definitive probabilistic conclusions can be drawn from branch counting since the number of
branches is inherently indeterminate. We should thus conclude that quantum probabilities cannot
be implemented at an objective level in an Everettian framework at all. Once the connection between
measurement probabilities and the branching structure is broken the problem of an incompatibility
between the two concepts disappears.
It still remains to be seen, however, exactly how measurement probabilities are related to Ev-
erettian QM at all. The second step in the Deutsch-Wallace argument is to implement probabilities
at a subjective level by introducing a decision theoretic analysis from the perspective of an agent
within the branching structure. Immediately before a branching event it is rational, taking the
perspective of an embedded agent, for me to consider the interests of my future selves in the var-
ious branches. Even though there is no fact of the matter about which future self I will become,
I should believe that I will become exactly one of them and, given it is uncertain which one I will
become, my current deliberations (in particular betting behaviour) should then be dictated by the
combination of my preference between the various possible eventualities and the extent to which I
think they are likely to be relevant to me.
The key to the Deutsch-Wallace argument is then to demand that the ordering an agent in such
a position of subjective uncertainty3 can apply to their preferences between the various outcomes,
is constrained by a set of basic rationality criteria (with the specifics differing slightly between
the various proofs). These rationality criteria are taken to be necessary for consistent reasoning
and include both seemingly self-evident conditions, such as coherence, and several more disputable
principles, such as diachronic consistency. Given this basis, the principal achievement of Deutsch-
Wallace proofs is then the demonstration that, up to linear transformations, we can fix the Born
rule as the only consistent subjective probability measure available to our deliberating agent.
3See [15] for detailed philosophical consideration of this idea and [16, §6.10.4] for consideration of its changing
role within Wallace’s arguments. An alternative ‘objective determinism’ understanding of personal identity in this
context has also been considered, see [3] and references therein for details. This distinction is not important for the
purposes of the arguments given here.
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As noted above, questions have been raised with regard to both the cogency of the rationality
criteria chosen, and the uniqueness of the relevant proofs. We will not here add to the already
substantial literature in this line. Rather, we will, for the sake of argument, accept that once the
first step of breaking the connection between objective branching structure and probabilities via
decoherence arguments has been achieved, a derivation of the Born rule as a subjective probability
measure along decision theoretic lines can be established. Thus, from our perspective, the crucial
issues with regard to probability in the DWE framework, will turn on whether or not decoher-
ence effects can consistently support the initial argumentative move to dismiss objective quantum
mechanical probability measures altogether.
2.2 Ontology and decoherence
The central Everettian claim, dating back to the work of DeWitt and Everett himself, is that
that theirs is the interpretation which is naturally implied by the bare mathematical formalism of
quantum theory – in particular, the unitary evolution of the quantum state is taken to be a com-
plete description of quantum dynamics. As we have seen, the Everettian ontology is constituted
by some form of branching tree structure with each branch corresponding to a discrete outcome
of events. Quantum mechanically the instantaneous state of such a branching structure corre-
sponds to a proper mixture of pure states: the branches can be understood as decoupled from
each other. It is from the perspective of an agent situated within this ontology (or something that
closely approximates it) that the Deutsch-Wallace argument, based upon classical decision theory,
is applied.
Within the quantum formalism there can, of course, exist states which cannot be understood in
terms of proper mixtures of pure states. When considering quantum systems we can, and generically
do, encounter quantum states which are irreducibly superpositions of different pure states and
thus correspond to non-classical interference between distinct outcomes. Such superposition states
cannot be represented in terms of a discrete branching tree structure and are inherently at conflict
with any application of classical decision theory. In other words, the observation that we do not
see macroscopic entanglement is a precondition for any notion of a classical rational agent existing
within a many worlds framework. Thus, we can insist that proponents of Everettian quantum
theory in general, and those who apply classical decision theory within it in particular, must
provide a mechanism for removing or discounting superposition states in the context of macroscopic
phenomena at the very least. In order to remain consistent with their own precepts they must do
this in the context of a formalism where the fundamental dynamics is unitary.
The move that is supposed to address this tension is the invocation of decoherence: a quasi-
classical branching structure can be shown to emerge from a fundamentally quantum mechanical
underlying reality based on the unitary evolution of the system. Thus, according to Wallace [17], the
Everettian can claim both that the quantum state is all there is and that there exist ‘worlds’ which
are mutually isolated structures instantiated within the dynamical state. We can thus understand
decoherence as a ‘dynamical process by which two components of a complex entity (the quantum
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state) come to evolve independently of one another, and it occurs due to rather high-level, emergent
consequences of the particular dynamics and initial state of our Universe.’ [17, p.10]
Crucially, this means that rather than eliminating the superposition states associated with
quantum mechanical interference, we are supposed to think of decoherence processes as merely
rendering their contribution to the quantum state of complex systems negligible for all practical
purposes. Thus, the discrete branching ontology fundamental to the many worlds picture in general,
and the Deutsch-Wallace subjective probability approach in particular, is not claimed to be estab-
lished by a direct decoherence algorithm starting with the quantum state. Rather, it is claimed, the
ubiquity of decoherence phenomena for reasonably complex systems on reasonably long time scales
means that one may justifiably treat the quantum mechanical description of high-level systems as
effectively describing a many worlds ontology.
3 Decoherence, circularity and incoherence: objecting to the Deutsch-
Wallace-Everett approach to quantum mechanics
It is crucial to the coherence of the DWE framework that by by invoking ‘decoherence theory’ the
Everettian is not introducing formal or conceptual machinery to which they are not entitled. In
particular, no notion of probability or ontology that is in direct conflict with the relevant Everettian
notions can consistently be relied upon to argue towards those notions, otherwise the scheme would
be conceptually incoherent. Furthermore, given the proponents of the DWE scheme claim that the
decision theoretic proofs enable them to derive the Born rule within the post-decoherence many
worlds structure, the non-circularity of such a derivation depends on the possibility of invoking
decoherence effects without the need to assume the Born rule. In this section we will investigate
three objections – two of incoherence one of circularity – all based upon a close analysis of the
details of decoherence.
3.1 Circularity and the Zurek contention
Let us follow the account given by Zurek [18] and consider the case of a simple set-up consisting
of a two state, spin-half system S and a quantum detector D. If we represent the two states of the
detector as |↑〉 and |↓〉 then we can simply consider a detector (also with two states) which is such
that:
|↑〉 | d↓〉 →|↑〉 | d↑〉 (1)
|↓〉 | d↓〉 →|↓〉 | d↓〉 (2)
Before the interaction between system and detector we can represent the initial state of the com-
posite system as:
| ΦI〉 = (α |↑〉+ β |↓〉) | d↓〉 (3)
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and after the interaction the quantum state of the composite system is:
| ΦC〉 = α |↑〉 | d↑〉+ β |↓〉 | d↓〉 (4)
The process that connects these two states is simply evolution according the the Schrodinger equa-
tion; such states are, therefore, given by the quantum formalism on its own. That this quantum
state can not be understood as a proper mixture of distinct outcomes can be seen easily by con-
sidering the relevant density matrix:
ρC = |α|2| ↑〉〈↑ ||d↑〉〈d↑|+ αβ∗ |↑〉〈↓|| d↑〉〈d↓|
+α∗β |↓〉〈↑|| d↓〉〈d↑|+ |β|2| ↓〉〈↓ ||d↓〉〈d↓| (5)
The off diagonal elements of this matrix if taken ontologically seriously would correspond to purely
quantum phenomena where outcomes are superposition states rather than distinct pure states.
Compare this to a reduced destiny matrix without the off diagonal elements:
ρR = |α|2| ↑〉〈↑ ||d↑〉〈d↑|+ |β|2| ↓〉〈↓ ||d↓〉〈d↓| (6)
This we can interpret as a proper mixture of pure states and so taking it ontologically seriously
would seem to imply the discrete branching structure which the Everettian requires. The idea is
then that we can understand decoherence as a process by which ρC ⇒ ρR through the (unitary)
interaction of the composite system and the environment. One assumes an interaction between
system and environment of the form:
| ΦC〉 | EC〉 = α |↑〉 | d↑〉E↑〉+ β |↓〉 | d↓〉E↓〉 =| Ψ〉 (7)
The claim is that when the states of the environment corresponding to the detector states are
orthogonal – i.e. we have that 〈Ei|Ei′〉 = δii′ – the density matrix for the original detector-system
combination post-decoherence is given by the expression:
ρPD = TrE |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Σi〈Ei|Ψ〉〈Ψ|Ei′〉 ∼= |α|2| ↑〉〈↑ ||d↑〉〈d↑|+ |β|2| ↓〉〈↓ ||d↓〉〈d↓| = ρR (8)
Environment induced decoherence does not fully eliminate the off diagonal elements, but it
re-scales them to vanishingly small amplitudes as given by the associated Born weights (see the
explicit formulas of [18] as well as references therein). In order for environment induced decoherence
to give us licence to ignore the superposition states – and therefore justify an interpretation of the
quantum state in terms of a discrete branching – we need one more step: we have to find a reason
for neglecting the off-diagonal terms due to their small values.
This can only be done, however, once we have an understanding as to what the numbers we
write into the density matrix mean. The simple statement that after evolving a quantum system
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relative to a background environment we can consistently attribute small numbers to entangled
states, has no relevance as long as we do not know what those numbers stand for. Obviously, we
cannot always neglect small parameter values. Neither would it make sense to neglect the early
stages of the universe on the grounds that the values of the time parameter are small, nor to
consider the electroweak interaction as relevant only when the value of the distance parameter is
high. In order to neglect small values in favour of larger values, we have to establish that the
magnitude of the corresponding variable is related to the entry’s effect on the measurement to be
performed. Since experimental testing and the entries in the density matrix are related in terms
of the probabilities for measuring certain outcomes, in order to establish the negligibility of small
entries in the density matrix we must introduce the Born rule. Following the influential analysis of
Zurek [9, p.25], we can state this crucial contention simply as:
Z Decoherence cannot be practiced without an independent prior derivation (or
assumption) of the Born rule.
A significant consequence of Z for the Deutsch-Wallace type derivation of the Born rule in terms
of subjective probability has been emphasised first by Zurek himself [9, p.25], and then by Baker
[11], and Kent [12]. In essence all three authors argue that, since decoherence must be assumed in
order to ground the DWE classical decision theoretic framework, and since by invoking decoherence
one is inevitably assuming the Born rule, the derivation of the Born rule within the DWE scheme
is inherently circular. Kent summaries this circularity objection as follows:
Even if one could show, as Wallace claims, that agents defined within that ontology
are rationally justified in using the Born rule as a calculus for decisions, it would seem
incorrect to portray this argument as a derivation of the Born rule within Everettian
quantum theory. Wallace’s argument should rather be understood as attempting to
show something weaker: that the Born rule re-emerges as output (albeit, to be fair, in
an interesting and non-obvious way) if assumed as input. [12, p.17]
Similarly, Baker specifically builds his detailed presentation of the objection around the need to
assume decoherence before we can consider the perspective of an agent making decisions with regard
to the distinct outcomes of quantum process (i.e. an agent playing a ‘quantum game’):
I claim that, since the employment of decoherence to identify branches depends upon
the unlikeliness of low-weight events, the framework of quantum games in which the
theorem is formulated presumes its conclusion. Unless the Born rule (or some simi-
lar rule permitting inferences from low weight to low probability) holds, there are no
quantum games in Everett. [11, p.21]
We thus see that the Zurek-Baker-Kent circularity objection to the DWE programme follows
in straightforward terms from the combination of the Zurek contention, Z above, together with
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the fairly self-evidently necessary requirement for proponents of the DWE scheme to assume de-
coherence prior to launching into decision theoretic calculus that eventually leads to the relevant
probability measure: Without decoherence there is no classical agential perspective, and without
this there is no basis for a Deutsch-Wallace type derivation of the Born rule. We can formalise the
situation as follows:
• Z. Decoherence cannot be practiced without an independent prior derivation (or assumption)
of the Born rule.
• P1. Decoherence effects are a necessary precondition for one to assume the perspective of
an agent making decisions (i.e. playing quantum games) within a world of distinct outcomes,
corresponding to the discrete branches of the many worlds ontology.
• P2. Adopting this agential perspective is necessary prior to any Deutch-Wallace type deriva-
tion of the Born rule as a subjective probability measure.
Therefore:
• C. Deutsch-Wallace type derivations of the Born rule as a subjective probability measure
are inherently circular since they involve the prior assumption of the Born rule in order to
establish the Born rule
Thus there exists a seemingly robust challenge to any Everttian claim of being able to derive the
Born rule based upon arguments of the Deutch-Walalce type. For all that, even if the Everettians
are forced to accept that they cannot, as claimed, derive the Born rule4 the Deutsch-Wallace
argument might seem to at least suggest consistency within the framework, and to possibly also
give an insight into the much discussed connection between objective and subjective notions of
probability [20]. However, as claimed above, the conceptual problems posed by decoherence for the
neo-Everettian approach go beyond an objection merely on the grounds of circularity.
3.2 Not just circular but incoherent
In the analysis above we saw that decoherence processes do not provide the foundations necessary
for establishing the DWE scheme without the prior assumption of a notion of probability as given
by the Born rule. This is because although such processes may act to re-scale the weightings of
the superposition states to be very small, the interpretation of the smallness of the parameter
as indicating the neglectability of the relevant entry in the density matrix relies on the prior
assumption of the Born rule. Implicit within this part of our argument towards Z is that when we
are considering the Born rule within a decoherence context, it is as a rule for relating the quantum
4They would, in this respect, then be at the disadvantage of their Bohmian rivals who’s own derivation would not
seem to be susceptible to the same objections on the grounds of circularity [19].
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formalism to some objective empirical feature of the ontology in question.5 In other words, in
assuming the Born rule for decoherence we must assume either that the squared absolute value
of the wave function corresponds to the objective probability that the corresponding experimental
outcome is in fact realised or that it corresponds to some other empirical structure from which
an objective probabilistic statement can be derived. Only once this is achieved can we have a
basis for neglecting any entries in the density matrix. We can thus be a little more specific than
above and argue that the decoherence process which the Everettian employs will inevitably involve
some prior notion of objective probabilities given by the Born rule, otherwise the required quasi-
classical branching structure ontology cannot be established. The probabilities corresponding to
the properties on which decoherence relies must be objective since decoherence is used to induce the
individuation of branches, which in turn is a necessary precondition for establishing a subjective
agent’s perspective at all. We clearly cannot, therefore, meaningfully define a subjective notion of
probability until the stage after deploying decoherence.6 This allows us to reformulate the Zurek
contention as follows:
Z* Decoherence cannot be practiced without an independent prior derivation (or
assumption) of the Born rule as an objective probability measure.
Recall from §2.1 that we saw it was necessary for the proponent of the DWE scheme to argue that
quantum probabilities cannot be implemented at an objective level in an Everettian framework
because of the need to avoid the inconsistency between (objective) probabilities given by a branch
counting strategy, and those corresponding to Born weightings. In more general terms, we can argue
that the viability of the DWE scheme rests upon there being no possible objective implementation
of probability in the Everettian framework. In order to see this even more clearly, let us assume for
a moment that predictions regarding the statistics of quantum processes could be extracted at the
objective level. In that case, one could distinguish two possible outcomes: either those predictions
would or they would not be in agreement with the Born rule. In the first case, one could use
that result immediately in support of Everettian QM and the deployment of the decision theoretic
arguments would be entirely superfluous. We would adopt an objective rather than a subjective
Everettian position since such a position would be directly supported by the formalism. In the
second case, we would have a direct contradiction between Everettian quantum mechanics and
observation. No decision theoretic argument could remove that contradiction and Everettian QM
would be considered refuted by empirical data. The claim that a decision theoretic argument can
5We will for the time being assume only one ontological regime, and therefore neglect the the possible implications
of viewing the many worlds ontology as emergent. A detailed consideration of whether a line of argument based upon
an emergent notion of ontology allow the proponent of the DWE scheme to rebut our incoherence objections will be
made in the following section.
6This suggests a general principle defining a limit to the explanatory role of subjective probability with regard to
the probabilistic structure of a physical theory. The primary precept : a subjective notion of probability cannot be used
to account for objective probabilistic features of a theory that are themselves necessary to invoke the perspective
of agents within the theory. This is (in a sense) the complement to Lewis’ [21] principal principle that (in the
terminology we are using) subjective probability should be constrained by objective probability.
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be used for establishing the viability of Everettian QM mechanics thus must rely on the assumption
that no probabilistic implications of Everettian QM can be derived at the objective level.7
At first glance, this result does not seem to rule out that an application of the Born rule at
the objective level could be justified by its subjective implementation. In other words, one might
hope that, though the Born rule can only be derived at the subjective level, its viability at this
level justifies its use at the objective level as well. This possibility is blocked, however, by the fact
that the decision theoretic derivation of the Born rule within the subjective perspective is based
on disregarding parts of the objective spectrum of quantum states. The Born rule is only enforced
on the individual agent once decoherence has provided the basis for ignoring macroscopically en-
tangled states. The fact that macroscopic entangled states are suppressed thus clearly must be a
consequence of the objective application of the Born rule but cannot possibly be a consequence of
the decision theoretic argument where those states are not considered at all. The decision theoretic
viability of the Born rule thus is a much less far-reaching claim than the objective viability of the
Born rule, which makes it utterly impossible to infer the latter from the former.
Thus, we have that the proponent of the DWE scheme must implicitly accept a prohibition
upon the objective implementation of the Born rule within their framework. When considered in
combination with our reformulated version of the Zurek contention, one is then lead directly to a
conceptual incoherence within the DWE argumentative structure:
• Z* Decoherence cannot be practiced without an independent prior derivation (or assumption)
of the Born rule as an objective probability measure.
• P1. Decoherence effects are a necessary precondition for one to assume the perspective of
an agent making decisions (i.e. playing quantum games) within a world of distinct outcomes,
corresponding to the discrete branches of the many worlds ontology.
• P2. Adopting this agential perspective is necessary prior to any Deutsch-Wallace type deriva-
tion of the Born rule as a subjective probability measure.
• P3. The viability of the DWE scheme rests upon there being no possible objective imple-
mentation of the Born rule in the Everettian framework.
Therefore:
• I1. The proponent of the DWE scheme must simultaneously assume: i) that the Born rule
corresponds to an objective probability measure in order to appeal to the decoherence effects
necessary to establish the Everettian ontology; and ii) that there is no possible objective
probability measure available otherwise they cannot consistently establish their own subjec-
tive probability measure.
7Here again it should be noted that it might be more appropriate to frame our argument in terms of an ontological
vs. epistemic distinction rather than objective vs. subjective. We retain the original terminology principally to avoid
confusion.
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The interpretation of the wave function, necessary for decoherence, as associating an objective
probability to states, thus is inconsistent with the core tenet of the subjectivist approach: the
provision of a decision theoretical foundation for a purely subjective notion probability.
3.3 Incoherence and ontological prejudice
A further, incoherent, consequence of the chain of reasoning just given is that by appealing to an
objective probabilistic notion of Born weights in order to justify neglecting superposition states,
one would seem to have accepted such an interpretation of the Born weights of distinct states also.
Thus we have that:
I2. In (effectively) eliminating superposition states due to their low Born weight
the Everettian must either also (effectively) eliminate similarly low weighted distinct
states and thus subvert their own position or simply apply a principle of ontological
prejudice, such that superposition states are eliminated simply on the grounds of being
superposition states, irrespective of their Born weighting.
Like other forms of prejudice, the essential problem is one of arbitrary discriminatory judgment:
there is no basis for privileging one state over the other apart form belonging to a class that has
been identified as privileged in principle. This second incoherence problem thus relates to the
conceptual basis for justifying the many worlds ontology in the context of decoherence: On the one
hand, in order to justify neglecting the superposition states the Everettian must assume that the
Born weights represent objective probabilities of being realised – a` la Copenhagen. On the other
hand, in order to frame their many words branching ontology they must insist that all distinct
states – even those with vanishingly small Born weights – are equally worthy of our attention.
Prima facie, this seems completely inconsistent unless the Everettian can provide an alternative
description of decoherence in which objective probabilities given by the Born rule are not assumed.
Without such an alternative understanding of decoherence they would seem to either have to reject
their own ontology (and thus give up their own interpretation!) or fall back to the endorsement of
outright ontological prejudice: irrespective of Born weights the superposition states are neglected
in favour of the distinct states merely on the virtue of the fact that they are superposition states.
Thus, we have our point I2.
One possible line of response that could be made in defence of the DWE scheme is that the
specifics of the decoherence effects are such that our second incoherence argument, relating to onto-
logical prejudice, can be rebuffed. Our ontological prejudice charge is based upon the combination
of the effective elimination of superposition states, with the retention of discrete states of compa-
rably low Born weighting. Now, here the defender of the DWE approach might respond that, in
practice, even the most unlikely discrete states will have a relatively much higher Born weighting
than the highest weighted superposition states because of the extremely high level of suppression
that decoherence effects enact. Whereas, the weightings of the off-diagonal elements fall off sharply
with time, those associated with the least likely on-diagonal elements will only decrease according
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to the proliferation of branching due to measurement. Thus, there is no need for prejudice to
establish as emergent a macro-regime that excludes superposition states but includes very unlikely
discrete states.
Such a chain of reasoning is, however, not viable within the context of the neo-Everettian notions
of branching and measurement. Under the DWE scheme, branching is not understood as being
solely (or even principally) linked to deliberate human measurement events, rather it is understood
as ‘completely ubiquitous’ [3, p.21] and to be mainly driven by random physical processes [17]. It is
this notion of measurement that, when combined with decoherence, is intended to ground a discrete
branching ontology within which the actual number of branches is fundamentally indeterminate.
Given such a framework, the counter-argument to the prejudice charge outlined above fails: it is only
by having an estimate of the number of branches on a given timescale (and thus also a concrete
model of the branching process) that we can establish a quantification of the Born weighting
associated with the lowest weighted discrete branch at that timescale, and without this there is no
sense in which a comparison with the (suitably suppressed) superposition states can be made. And,
of course, if one does admit a definite, enumerable branching structure, one immediately falls foul
of the conflict between probabilities based upon branch counting, and those based upon the Born
rule. Thus, even if one can construct an explicit model that justifies neglecting superposition states
without prejudice, because it is predicated upon establishing a definite number of branches, the
counter-argument would not merely fail to shield the DWE approach from the second incoherence
charge, it would actually serve to entirely undermine the conceptual foundations upon which the
scheme is built.
A simple example will further illustrate each of our two strong claims of incoherence. Let us
again consider a simple two state system together with the detector as described above. Given
that we have an appropriately repeatable preparation methodology, we can consider an arbitrarily
large number of identical trials, n. For small n decoherence involves us associating to states
corresponding to sequences of distinct outcomes relatively high Born weights, and to the states
corresponding sequences of non-district outcomes (i.e. superposition states) very low Born weights.
By interpreting these Born weights as objective probabilities we could reasonably argue that the
superposition states should be neglected. However if we do this and then want to apply an DWE
type interpretation based on subjective probabilities, it seems we would have to forget about these
objective probabilities as being relevant to the distinct states. This is the inconsistency problem
I1. Let us then consider the situation for very large n, in that context we would have some states
corresponding to sequences of distinct outcomes which have vanishingly small Born weights – e.g.
all trials result in |↑〉. Neglecting for the moment the inconsistency problem, if the Everettians
apply an objective interpretation of the Born weights in order to eliminate the superposition states
on the grounds of their very low probability then they must also eliminate, for large n, distinct ‘all
up’ states on the grounds of their very low probability. But this the Everettian cannot do if they
are to maintain their many world ontology. Thus, ontological prejudice as described above above
becomes a necessity and we have I2.
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4 Emergent worlds?
The principal neo-Everettian bulwark against charges of conceptual incoherence, such as those
presented above, must be expected to be some form of argument from emergence. In his [16],
Wallace specifically responds to the weaker circularity version of our objection in such terms. In
essence, the counter argument is that one may understand the Born weights as ‘telling us when some
emergent structure really is robustly present ’ [italics added]. This coincides with the treatment of
[17], where a discrete branching structure is understood as a robust yet emergent feature of reality
(p.15).
One may thus naturally anticipate a counter argument to our charges of incoherence that seeks
to deflate the prior use of the Born measure by connecting it to the robustness of an emergent
structure, rather than an objective probability rule. The notion is that one may say that the many
worlds branching structure is robustly present in the quantum mechanical wavefunction in the same
sense as tigers, phonons and galaxies are robustly present in the relevant underlying microphysics,
but in making such a statement one need not apply the Born rule – i.e. interpret the Born measure
in a probabilistic sense.
What we are to make of such claims regarding ‘emergent structure’ and ‘robust feature of reality’
is far from clear. On the one hand, it would be unreasonable to simply dismiss such language on
grounds of vagueness. Although talk of emergence and structure is notoriously difficult to make
precise, it has not gained considerable currency within both the philosophy of physics and the
philosophy of science without good reason.8 Yet, on the other hand, we must be careful to make
transparent and substantive characterisations of the claims involved otherwise their exact relevance
to our incoherence charges will not be clear.
The first crucial distinction that can be made is between a notion of robustness that is em-
pirically grounded and one that is not. By this we mean some qualification such that whether a
structure within the formalism of a theory is taken to be robust is dependent upon some interpreta-
tional connection between that structure and empirical phenomenology. Clearly, the kind of thing
that can provide empirical grounding to our notion of robustness is dependent upon the context at
hand. The structure of a tigers, for example, might be established as a robust one via the consid-
eration of a connection between an array of formal patters in our microphysics, and the zoological
phenomena, such as, for example, eating philosophers! The micro-physical pattern corresponding
to a coincidental arrangement of a tiger’s tail resting in a glass of warm milk, on the other hand,
cannot be understood as a robust structure in the same sense precisely because it fails to have any
empirical grounding in zoology or otherwise. Clearly, in this case that the tiger-tail-milk structure
fails to be empirically grounded can be taken to also imply that it has no explanatory value. In
fact, in general, it seems reasonable to expect that any structure that has explanatory value within
a scientific theory must also have some (possibly indirect) empirical grounding within that theory.
However, the converse need not be true: we can think of structures that are empirically grounded
8The collection of readings in [22] gives a nice overview of the various scientific and philosophical perspectives on
emergence that can be found in contemporary literature.
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but have no reasonable explanatory value – an uninterpreted set of observations for instance. Thus,
our notion of the what it means for a structure to be robust is essentially weaker than the Dennett
criterion invoked by Wallace in a similar context [16, p.50].
We can make the relevance of this grounding requirement to the case in hand immediately
apparent by considering two possible structures within a quantum wavefunction. One we define
via the reciprocal of the norm of the amplitudes components of states (relative to some basis).
The other we define in the usual Born measure terms. Given an empirically grounded notion of
robustness in terms of quantum mechanical measurements there is a clear sense in which the second
structure could be understood as robust, but the first could not. Conversely, without empirical
grounding via a link to phenomenology, designating a structure as ‘robust’ becomes a vacuous term
and is unable to do the work required of it in differentiating between the two cases. Specifically, it
would not help us understand why it is a reasonable idea to neglect very low Born weights based
on the first structure, but a not so good one to neglect high Born weights based on the second.
Given this requirement that any ‘robust structure’ must be empirically grounded, we can then
build towards a more precise characterisation of the ‘emergent multiverse’ claim such that the
relevance (or not) for our incoherence problems can be accurately ascertained. To do this let
us consider a exemplar of ‘robust yet emergent structure’ within physical theory taken from the
framework of effective field theory (EFT) [23, 24, 25]. This is a useful case to consider since it:
a) has an accompanying well developed scientific and philosophical literature from which a precise
notion emergence can be drawn; and b) is reasonably analogous to the case of decoherence/many
worlds with which we are concerned.
Following Bain [25], we can consider an EFT of a physical system as a theory of the dynamics
of the system at energies small compared to a given cutoff (or characteristic energy threshold).
In certain cases, the low energy states with respect to the cutoff are effectively independent of
(decoupled from) states at high energies, and thus one may study the low-energy regime of the
theory without the need for a detailed description of the high-energy regime. Many important
physical systems admit a description in terms of EFTs (significant cases are found within particle
physics, nuclear physics and condensed matter physics) and it is within the context of the ontological
decoupling found within EFTs that we can consider a basic model for the concept of emergence
that will be very useful to our analysis.
If we consider the pairing of an EFT and the relevant high-energy theory, then a precise notion
of emergence is encapsulated within the the following (much simplified) framework: i) At energies
low compared with the relevant cutoff a particular Lagrangian density provides a good description
of the system; ii) At energies comparable or higher than the cutoff a different Lagrangian density
provides a good description of the system; iii) The difference between these two mathematical
formalisms is substantial enough to warrant them being interpreted in terms of different ontologies
since they are defined based upon a different set field variables (and therefore different fundamental
degrees of freedom); iv) In this context we can then define the ontology of the low energy effective
theory as being emergent from that of the high-energy theory.
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Two crucial connections can be understood as necessary towards establishing this framework for
defining emergence. The first connection is between the scaling of the relevant parameter (energy
relative to the cutoff) and the empirical significance of particular aspects of the formalism (terms in
the Lagrangian density): as the energy relative to the cutoff becomes low, the contribution of certain
terms within the Lagrangian density become relatively much smaller than other terms. The second
connection is between the significance of these formal structures (smallness of the terms) and their
eliminablity from the formalism (Lagrangian density): the terms which are relatively much smaller
are removed from the Lagrangian density because they are less empirically significant.9 Whereas,
the first connection is established purely by the form of the relevant equations, the second relies on
our interpretation of small parameter values of terms within the Lagrangian density as implying
the negligible physical relevance of whatever ontological structures can be associated with those
terms. Given this interpretational step leading to the second condition, we can then give a precise
meaning to the statement that ‘the ontology of the EFT is emergent’; but without it there is a gap
in our chain of reasoning.
We thus again run into the subtle, yet crucial, issue of needing a physical basis for neglecting
small parameter values: we have to establish that the magnitude of a term within the Lagrangian
density is related to its effect on the measurement to be performed. Now, for the case of EFTs
we of course have a fairly straightforward basis for making the necessary connection between the
formal and the empirical. Terms which make a very small contribution to the Lagrangian density
will make a correspondingly small contribution to the relevant S-matrix. Given an interpretation
of this matrix in probabilistic terms (via its connection to the relevant scattering amplitudes), we
can then establish that neglecting very small terms in the Lagrangian density will have a negligible
effect to any measurement performed on the system. Thus, we have a solid basis for the relevant
interpretational step, and can consider the ontology of the low level theory as a ‘robust but emergent
structure’ in a sense that has the necessary empirically grounding.
Clearly, there is much more that could be said on these issue, all we have here is a rather
simplistic scheme for characterising both emergence and EFTs. However, given this analysis we
can at least provide a substantive idea of what it means to say that ‘the ontology of the EFT is
emergent’. It would seem reasonable to require the notion of emergence deployed in the defence of
an Everettian ontology to be as least as substantive as this basic sketch.
Let us then distill the key elements of this notion of emergence, as we have defined it in the con-
text of effective field theory, into a a more general schema applicable to the many worlds/decoherence
case. In essence what we had in the EFT case was: i) a clear notion of the the parameter that
is being scaled between the two regimes; ii) two distinct mathematical formalisms, one relevant
to each regime with the formal distinction established (at least partially) via the scaling of the
parameter; and iii) an explicit basis for connecting the difference between the two formalisms to
9This crucial feature can be seen explicitly within the ‘Wilsonian EFT’ scheme where the irrelevant terms are
neglected on precisely the basis of scaling in powers of E/Λ (where E is the energy scale and Λ is the cutoff). It
is also implicit within the ‘continuum EFT’ scheme since a similar discarding of terms due to scaling behaviour is
needed to calculate the matching correction. See [25].
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an ontological distinction. Together these three aspects were taken as sufficient to establish an
emergent ontology in the EFT case – we should therefore accept something similar as establishing
a discrete branching structure as an emergent ontology.
Environment induced decoherence is a process with effects that scale with both time and com-
plexity: on longer timescales and in more complex systems decoherence effects become greater. It is
natural, then, to think of the two regimes that we are considering as being: a short time scale, low
complexity regime; and a longer time scale high complexity regime. For simplicity we shall simply
call them the ‘macro-regime’ and ‘micro-regime’, and consider a basic model of decoherence (along
the lines of [18, pp.12-14]) within which the time parameter controls the suppression of the relevant
off-diagonal terms. We thus have that in the micro-regime the relevant mathematical formalism is a
density matrix of the form ρC above, and in the macro-regime the relevant mathematical formalism
is a density matrix of the form ρR. There is an explicit basis for considering this formal difference as
grounding an ontological difference since the states that can be represented through the formalism
relevant to the micro-regime include the discrete and superposition states, and those that can be
represented by the formalism relevant to the micro-regime include only discrete states.
We are therefore in a position to call the ontology of the macro-regime a robustly emergent
structure, provided the two crucial connections discussed above hold. Firstly, we need to connect
the scaling of the relevant parameter (time) and the significance of particular aspects of the for-
malism (off-diagonal elements of the density matrix). In Zurek’s simple model [18, pp.12-14] this
connection obtains explicitly since the ‘decoherence term’ in his Eq. 17 leads to a strong decay
(i.e. reduction with respect to time) in the off-diagonal elements, but has negligible effect on the
on-diagonal elements. Thus, the first connection holds. The second connection required is between
the relative smallness of these off-diagonal density matrix elements and their eliminablity from the
formalism. Above we saw that in order for this connection to hold we need a physical basis for
the interpretational step of neglecting small values. In order to justify neglecting very small entries
within a density matrix we need to connect this formal structure to some empirical structure: we
must argue that neglecting low Born weighted states has a negligible impact upon measurements
of the system. Thus we must apply some version of the Born rule as an objective measure of
probability of experimental outcomes. We therefore, have that without the objective Born rule we
cannot coherently claim that the ontology of the macro-regime emerges, and so arrive at precisely
the logical structure with regard to subjective/objective probability, decoherence, and many worlds
quantum mechanics as was detailed above. Our two incoherence arguments may thus again be
brought to bare, and the position for the proponent of a DWE type scheme becomes just as fraught
as before.
5 Conclusion
The Deutsch-Wallace-Everett programme can be understood as conceptually incoherent since its
viability rests upon a notion of decoherence that conflicts with its own fundamental precepts with
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regard to both the subjective nature of probability, and the discrete nature of ontology. Under
careful analysis, these problems are not alleviated by invoking the notion of emergent or robust
structure, and thus, as it stands, our twin issues of incoherence must be seen as rendering the
scheme deeply inadequate as an approach to quantum theory.
Some ideas are too attractive to be considered false; and some are too ugly to be considered true.
Still others, despite their apparent beauty, turn out simply inconsistent, no matter how seductive
they may be at first sight. This third category of elegant incoherence carries the highest risk of
leading astray, and it is there, alas, that the seemingly revolutionary Deutsch-Wallace approach to
Everettian quantum theory must be situated.
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